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Abstract
Background: The fundamental determinant of death in donation after circulatory determination of death
is the cessation of brain circulation and function. We therefore propose the term donation after brain circulation
determination of death [DBCDD].
Results: In DBCDD, death is determined when the cessation of circulatory function is permanent but before it is
irreversible, consistent with medical standards of death determination outside the context of organ donation.
Safeguards to prevent error include that: 1] the possibility of auto-resuscitation has elapsed; 2] no brain circulation
may resume after the determination of death; 3] complete circulatory cessation is verified; and 4] the cessation of
brain function is permanent and complete. Death should be determined by the confirmation of the cessation of
systemic circulation; the use of brain death tests is invalid and unnecessary.
Because this concept differs from current standards, consensus should be sought among stakeholders. The patient or
surrogate should provide informed consent for organ donation by understanding the basis of the declaration of death.
Conclusion: In cases of circulatory cessation, such as occurs in DBCDD, death can be defined as the permanent
cessation of brain functions, determined by the permanent cessation of brain circulation.
Keywords: Transplantation, Ethics, Donation after circulatory determination of death [DCDD], Extracorporeal
membrane oxygenation [ECMO], Brain criterion of death, Determination of death

Background
Human death has been conceptualized traditionally as a
unitary phenomenon characterized by the irreversible
cessation of the three vital functions: respiration, circulation and brain function [1]. Advances in life-sustaining
therapies have disrupted the unitary nature of death,
because now, new technologies can support or restore
some vital functions while others remain absent [2]. The
development of mechanical ventilation in the 1950s
permitted the maintenance of respiratory and, thereby,
circulatory functions, despite the irreversible cessation of
brain function [3]. That the three vital functions no longer are interdependent stimulated the development of
the brain criterion of death [4].
Advances in resuscitation techniques, particularly cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and extracorporeal
membrane oxygenation (ECMO)-assisted CPR [5–7]
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now allow recovery of patients formerly considered
dead. In donation after circulatory determination of
death (DCDD) programs, because of the need to
optimize organ suitability for donation, death is declared shortly after circulatory cessation [8], a time
which has provoked questions over the validity of
death determination [9–13].
Novel resuscitation techniques and DCDD have shown
the need for a more explicit analysis of death by raising
several controversial questions. Is the DCDD patient actually dead at the moment death is pronounced given
that the cessation of circulation may not be irreversible
at that time? Is reliance on the permanent cessation of
circulation sufficient grounds to declare death? [14]
How are the phenomena of circulatory cessation and
brain cessation related as criteria of death? Which criterion should be used to determine death in the context of
DCDD programs: the circulatory criterion, as practiced
in the U.S. [15], the brain criterion [16] as practiced in
Switzerland [17], the Netherlands [18], and other

© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.

Dalle Ave and Bernat BMC Medical Ethics (2017) 18:15

European countries, or both? And how in ideal practice
should death be determined?
We address these questions in this article and conclude that the permanent cessation of brain circulation
is the critical element underlying both the circulatory
and brain determination of death. We therefore propose
a new term of this concept: organ donation after brain
circulation determination of death (DBCDD).

The fundamental criterion of death is the
cessation of brain function
While the three vital functions (respiration, circulation
and brain function) are interrelated and interdependent
in the absence of medical intervention, the fundamental
determinant of death is the irreversible cessation of
brain function [19–21]. This state is achieved commonly
by one of two pathways: (1) the permanent cessation of
systemic (including brain) circulation after circulatory
arrest; and (2) the cessation of brain circulation resulting
from markedly increased intracranial pressure following
a catastrophic brain injury [22].
Through the pathway of catastrophic brain injury,
death is determined by the brain criterion of death, i.e.
by the irreversible cessation of all clinical brain functions, including the brainstem [4, 23], while respiratory
and circulatory functions remain sustained by mechanical ventilation. Through the pathway of circulatory
cessation, the fundamental criterion of death is also the
brain criterion. As a consequence of the cessation of
systemic circulation, brain circulation ceases followed
rapidly by a progressive neuronal destruction due to
hypoxemia and ischemia [2], leading to the irreversible
cessation of all brain function.
We offer two examples showing that, through the
pathway of circulatory cessation, the bodily circulation
most relevant to death determination is that to the brain.
In the first example, a patient with cessation of systemic
circulation has her brain circulation sustained by local
ECMO. Her brain function remains intact because of
the ongoing brain circulation, while her bodily circulation has otherwise ceased. The usual circulatory criterion of death, i.e. the cessation of systemic circulation,
would declare this patient dead, despite the fact that she
might be fully conscious.
In the second example, a DCDD donor has her
systemic circulation sustained by ECMO, while brain
circulation is blocked by either an inflated aortic occlusion balloon [24] or an aortic occlusive clamp [25].
Depending on the degree to which the balloon or the
clamp excludes brain perfusion, the DCDD donor may
be either dead or alive [26, 27]. These two examples
show that, in the pathway of circulatory cessation, the
relevant circulation in the determination of death is
that to the brain.
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From irreversibility to permanency in the
determination of death
Philosophical and biological concepts of death require irreversibility. Irreversibility means that, once circulation
and respiration have ceased, they cannot restart spontaneously and cannot be restored by any available technologies [28]. Yet, the medical determination of death
using the circulatory/respiratory criterion relies on the
permanent cessation of respiration and circulation. Permanent means that the ceased functions will not recover
because they will not restart spontaneously and no medical attempts will be made to restart them. Therefore, a
noncongruence exists between the concept of death that
requires an irreversible cessation of vital functions and
the medical standard of death determination that requires only their permanent cessation [28].
In the context of donation after brain determination of
death (DBDD), brain death is declared only once physicians have established the irreversible cessation of brain
function [23]. Irreversibility depends on the fact that, despite advances in brain resuscitation [29], no available technology can restore brain function once death has been
confirmed by brain death tests [23]. Brain death has traditionally been formulated as a retrospective determination
that shows that all clinical brain functions have ceased.
In the context of circulatory cessation (including
DBCDD), irreversibility is, at least to some extent, contingent on physician action or inaction [30]. Apart from
scenarios in which irreversibility is obvious clinically (eg,
decapitation, incineration, decomposition, and rigor
mortis), physicians declare death before a state of irreversibility has been achieved. It is common, particularly
in the intensive care setting, to determine death only a
few minutes after circulation ceases [31].
The exact duration of complete circulatory cessation
necessary to achieve the irreversible cessation of brain
function remains unknown [22]. Outcome studies after
cardiac arrest reveal that some brain functions can be
restored by resuscitation maneuvers after as long as 20
[32] to 30 min [33] of no-flow, i.e. from the time from
collapse to the initiation of CPR [16]. Animal studies
show that some brain functions may be restored after as
long as 60 min of circulatory cessation [34–36].
These data suggest that, in DBCDD programs, the
no-touch period - i.e. the time from circulatory cessation to the declaration of death which is usually 2–
20 min [19, 37–39] - is too short to have achieved an
irreversible cessation of neuronal function necessary to
determine brain death. Furthermore, new technologies
such as ECMO are able to restore some brain functions
after approximately 30 min of circulatory cessation. Thus,
in the context of circulatory cessation (including DBCDD),
death is often determined during a state of permanent cessation but before a state of irreversible cessation [14].
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Apart from the DBCDD context, physicians’ usual
determination of death using permanent cessation is justified when several conditions are fulfilled: 1) The possibility
of auto-resuscitation has elapsed; 2) No action will be initiated to restore circulation after the determination of
death; 3) Further elapsed time will permit confirming the
certainty of death; 4) There are social reasons for physicians to declare death sooner rather than later; and 5)
Brain function has permanently and completely ceased.
Let us now analyze whether these justifications in nondonation settings are sufficient grounds to declare death
before irreversibility in the DBCDD context.
1) The possibility of auto-resuscitation has elapsed
Auto-resuscitation refers to the spontaneous return
of heartbeat and circulation after asystole [2]. To
avoid the possibility of a patient’s revival after having
been declared dead, death cannot be declared until
the possibility of auto-resuscitation has elapsed.
The minimal no-touch period to wait to ensure the
impossibility of auto-resuscitation is unknown [40].
In one comprehensive retrospective study of
withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy, the
investigators found not a single case of autoresuscitation to restored circulation [41]. An
observational study showed that ‘the longest
period of cessation of arterial blood pressure
before resumption was 89 sec [40]. While cardiac
electrical activity persisted in some patients for
more than 30 min after cardiac arrest, the authors
concurred that ‘true autoresuscitation required the
spontaneous return of circulation’ and not merely the
return of cardiac electrical activity [2, 39–41]. By
contrast, after failed CPR in the setting of unexpected
cardiac arrest, auto-resuscitation to circulation
remains possible after 7 min of cardiac arrest [41].
Available data suggest that in controlled DCDD
following withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy, a
no-touch period of 5 min is sufficient to ensure the
impossibility of auto-resuscitation. But in uncontrolled DCDD after failed resuscitative efforts in an
unexpected cardiac arrest, a no-touch period for as
long as 10 min may be necessary [42].
2) No action will be initiated to restore circulation after
the determination of death
Because after circulatory cessation, death usually is
declared before the cessation of brain functions
become irreversible, brain functions potentially
could respond to the restoration of brain circulation
[43]. To avoid this risk, the use of any procedures or
technologies that can restore brain circulation
should be avoided following the determination of
death [19, 26, 43, 44]. DBCDD programs should
avoid the use of post-mortem ECMO, as currently
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practiced in some controlled DBCDD programs
[24, 25, 45–47] and several uncontrolled DBCDD
programs [48, 49]. The post-mortem use of
ECMO may retroactively invalidate the preceding
death declaration by negating the necessary
condition of permanent cessation of circulation.
Similarly, the use of CPR after the declaration of
death, as practiced in some uncontrolled DBCDD
programs [48, 49], should be avoided, because it may
restore brain circulation. Inflation of the lungs after
the declaration of death, which some transplantation
programs use when the lungs are planned to be
procured, should be avoided, because it may
stimulate the return of spontaneous heartbeat and
circulation. Our current resuscitative technology
has complicated the concept of irreversibility
which now may be contingent on physician action
or inaction [28].
The case of cold organ preservation solution
ECMO
The University of Pittsburgh Medical Center is
developing an innovative uncontrolled DCDD
protocol using post-mortem ECMO with cold organ
preservation solution instead of blood to preserve
organs [50]. In their protocol, brain perfusion is resumed after the declaration of death not with blood
but with cold fluid. Although the cold solution cannot oxygenate the brain, the accompanying
hypothermia slows brain neuronal metabolism.
Hypothermia could invalidate the preceding determination of death by preventing the brain neuronal
hypoxic-ischemic damage that allows death to be determined on the grounds of the permanent cessation
of circulation. We therefore recommend avoiding
the use of cold organ preservation solution ECMO.
3) Further elapsed time will permit confirming the
certainty of death
One controversy in declaring death prior to a state
of irreversibility in DBCDD is that, because organ
procurement rapidly follows the determination of
death, the ability to confirm the certainty of death is
diminished [10]. Because death in DBCDD is
followed by organ procurement, the diagnosis of
death must be certain [13].
In DBDD, irreversibility is necessary to diagnose
death, because of the ongoing circulation and the
risk of confounded and reversible conditions that
may mimic brain death [23]. In DBCDD,
irreversibility is unnecessary to the diagnosis of
death because the permanent cessation of
circulation will always lead to the irreversible
cessation of brain function. The risk of error in the
determination of death in the context of circulatory
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cessation results only from whether circulatory
cessation is total and whether the possibility of
auto-resuscitation has elapsed.
Because in the DBCDD context, the cessation of
circulation must be total, a technique such as
intra-arterial monitoring, Doppler flow study, or
echocardiography showing the non-opening of the
aortic valve should be required to confidently
distinguish the complete absence of circulation from
the presence of small degree of circulation [20].
4) There are social reasons for physicians to declare
death sooner than later
In cases of circulatory cessation, physicians have
declared death prior to the moment of irreversibility
for social reasons without creating controversy.
Delaying the declaration of death for a few hours
while awaiting clinical signs of irreversibility (lividity,
rigidity), imposes unjustifiable harms on family
members. Interference with the bereavement
process and preparation of the body caused by the
delay in the determination of death may produce
emotional and psychological suffering.
It was not until DBCDD standards of death
determination had to be made explicit that any
controversy arose. We believe that the social reasons
to declare death prior to irreversibility also apply in
the DBCDD context. Because the declaration of
death is more consequential in the DBCDD context,
there should be safeguards to assure that: 1) the
possibility of auto-resuscitation has elapsed; 2)
circulatory cessation is total; 3) no actions will be
initiated after the declaration of death that may
possibly resume brain circulation and/or function;
and 4) brain functions must have ceased
permanently and completely.
5) Brain functions have permanently and completely
ceased
One worry raised by critics of relying on permanent
cessation to declare death in DBCDD is that the
donor may suffer because organ procurement will
happen before the state of brain function
irreversibility [51]. These critics claim that whereas, a
“premature” declaration of death may be
inconsequential outside the DBCDD context, it is very
consequential in DBCDD, because bodily integrity
may be damaged by organ procurement. To avoid any
risks of inducing suffering on DBCDD donors by
surgical procedures [52], we must be certain that the
declaration of death corresponds to the cessation of
all brain functions, thereby excluding the possibility of
feeling pain and awareness.
The precise time interval after brain circulatory
cessation necessary to ensure the complete cessation
of brain function is unknown. There is a consensus
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among neuroscientists and neurologists that brain
function is a necessary condition of awareness, and
that normothermic patients who have completely
lost systemic (and therefore brain) circulation for
more than a few minutes have no brain function or
awareness. Brain circulatory cessation for 5 min at
normothermia thus ensures the permanent and
complete cessation of all brain functions. This
condition, in turn, ensures that the DBCDD donor
cannot experience any pain, suffering or awareness.
The clinical assessment of the absence of brain
function in the context of circulatory cessation
cannot be accomplished easily. Surface
electroencephalogram (EEG) examination may show
the absence of thalamocortical electrical activity, but
cannot exclude residual activity within brain stem
structures [10, 19, 51]. In a case series of bispectral
(BIS) measurements during DBCDD, the BIS value
fell quasi-instantly to zero after cardiac arrest [53].
In the observational study done by Dhanani et al.,
EEG activity stopped rapidly after circulatory
cessation but persisted for 26 min in one patient.
The authors concluded that the measured EEG
activity in that case was artifact [40]. A recent
literature review revealed that most analyzed studies
showed the absence of consciousness and EEG
activity within 30 s of circulatory cessation [54].
The confirmation of the precise period of time
necessary to achieve the permanent and complete
cessation of brain function after circulatory
cessation must be further studied. In the
meantime, a no-touch period of 5 min seems
sufficient to achieve the permanent and complete
cessation of all brain functions.

How is death determined in DBCDD?
In the context of circulatory cessation, death is determined by the confirmation of the cessation of circulation
and respiration. In the context of DBCDD, the complete
cessation of systemic circulation should be confirmed
with certainty by the use of an arterial line, a Doppler, or
an echocardiogram.
If any technologies or procedures are used that
possibly could resume brain circulation after death declaration, it must be proven that brain circulation has
been completely excluded [26]. However, there may be
technical difficulties in interpreting brain blood flow
studies to prove the complete absence of brain circulation, particularly in distinguishing zero blood flow from
a very small amount of blood flow.
The use of accepted and validated brain death test
batteries in the context of DBCDD is inapplicable and
unnecessary [16]. In DBDD, brain death tests are valid
only if reversible causes of brain function cessation have
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been excluded, which is unfeasible in DBCDD, as we
have discussed elsewhere [16].
Furthermore, because systemic circulatory cessation
will automatically cause brain circulation to cease, which
will lead to the progressive destruction of neuronal
tissue, it is unnecessary to use brain death tests in the
context of DBCDD. The confirmation of the permanent
absence of systemic circulation is thus sufficient to determine death. To ensure that the possibility of autoresuscitation has elapsed, death should be declared only
after at least 5 min of no-touch period in controlled
DBCDD and 10 min in uncontrolled DBCDD.

Conclusion
When systemic circulation ceases, the criterion of death
is the permanent cessation of brain circulation. When
organ donation is conducted, we call it donation after
brain circulation determination of death or DBCDD.
The brain circulation criterion of death becomes valid
once six conditions are fulfilled as listed in Table 1.
Our proposal departs from medical standards of brain
death in which the retrospective irreversible cessation of
brain function has been a longstanding requirement. This
prospective determination of permanent cessation of brain
circulation and function is sufficient to declare that the
DBCDD donor is dead. Our proposal has the advantage of
unifying the phenomenon of death under the single brain
criterion of death for both common pathways: circulatory
cessation and primary brain damage.

Table 1 The conditions of validity of the brain criterion of
death in the context of DBCDD
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Death could thus be defined as the permanent cessation
of brain functions, determined either by the permanent
cessation of brain circulation in cases of circulatory cessation (including to the brain) or by the irreversible cessation of brain functions in cases of severe brain injury.
Abbreviations
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Conditions of validity
1]

The possibility of autoresuscitation has elapsed:
− no-touch period of 5 min in controlled DBCDD
− no-touch period of 10 min in uncontrolled DBCDD

2]

No interventions that may resume brain circulation
after the determination of death will be performed:
− no CPR - no ECMO, unless the brain circulation
is proven to have been securely excluded
− no lung inflation

3]

The diagnostic of cessation of brain circulation is
certain using at least one test:
flat arterial line
− no arterial Doppler signal
− no opening of the aortic valve on echocardiography

4]

There is a permanent and complete cessation of
all brain functions:
− a minimal no-touch period of 5 min is required

5]

There is consensus that the determination of death
may be based on the permanent cessation of brain
circulation and function

6]

Informed consent for DBCDD has been obtained
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